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SOME ASPECTS OF MINORITY UNION PICIETING
IN NEW YORK
PHILIP FELDBLUMt
Section 8b(4) (C) of the Taft-Hartley Act' provides that it shall be
unlawful for a labor organization to engage in, induce or encourage a
strike where an object thereof is "forcing or requiring any employer to
recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the repre-
sentative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified
as the representative of such employees under the provisions of Section
9." The NYSLRA, although it provides for certification of majority
representatives, 2 contains no prohibition against union unfair labor prac-
tices and no provision similar to § 8b(4) (C). The New York courts,
however, not only anticipated, but have extended, the rule enunciated
in § 8b (4) (C) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The historical development of
this judicial doctrine presents an interesting, if confusing, subject.
The purpose of this article is to trace the development of the current
New York doctrine concerning minority picketing, analyze its rationale
and consider the limitations imposed upon its application by the Taft-
Hartley Act.
1932-1940
The New York Court of Appeals, in Stillwell Theatre Inc. v. Kaplan,"
decided in i932, held it lawful for a union, peacefully and truthfully,
to picket an employer who had a contract with a rival union, even though
the employees were all members of the contracting union. "Resulting
injury" to the employer was said to be "incidental and must be endured."4
The Stillwell case antedated the enactment of C.P.A. § 876-a, which
t Member of the New York Bar. The opinions expressed herein are those of the
author and are not to be attributed to the New York State Labor Relations Board.
1. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (C) (Supp. 1950). For convenience
the following will be used: Taft-Hartley Act for Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 141 et. seq. (Supp. 1950). NLRA for National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S. C. § 151 el seq. (1946). NLRB
for National Labor Relations Board. NYSLRA for New York State Labor Relations
Act, Article 20 of the New York State Labor Law § 700 et seq. (1948). NYSLRB for New
York State Labor Relations Board. C.P.A. § 876-a for New York Civil Practice Act
876-a (1946).
2. NYSLRA § 705 (1948).
3. 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 606 (1933). See also
J. H. S. Theatre v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); Edjomac Amusement Corp.
v. Empire State Motion Pictures Operators' Union Inc. et al., 273 N. Y. 647, 8 N. E.
2d 329 (1937).
4. 259 N.Y. 405, 409, 182 N.E. 63, 64.(1932).
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restricted the issuance of injunctions in "labor disputes," and also pre-
ceded the adoption of NLRA and NYSLRA. The decision was rendered
at a time when employers were under no legal compulsion to bargain
collectively, when company dominated unions were not unlawful, closed
shop contracts were valid even though the union represented only a
minority, or none, of the employees, and discrimination against employees
because of union membership or activity was not prohibited? Accord-
ingly, it was then accurate for the Court of Appeals to refer to the
employer in the Stillwell case as having "patronized"" the contracting
union, and to state that the conduct of the employer might be objection-
able to the defendant union. To grant an injunction "would thereby give
to one union an advantage over another by prohibiting the use of peaceful
and honest persuasion in matters of economic and social rivalry. This
might strike a death blow to legitimate labor activities."'
C.P.A. § 876-a, enacted in 1935, specified the procedures to be followed,
and the extent to which injunctions could issue, in "labor disputes." A
"labor dispute," as defined therein, includes, among other things, any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, the associ-
ation or representation of persons in negotiating terms or conditions of
employment, "or any other controversy arising out of the respective
interests of employer and employees, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee."8 A case
involves a "labor dispute" if the persons involved "are engaged in the
same industry, trade, craft or occupation" and whether the dispute is
between employees or unions and employers or employer associations,
between employer associations, between employees and the unions, or
between unions.9
The NLRA (1935) and NYSLRA (1937) both guaranteed to em-
ployees the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, to engage in
concerted activities, and to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, free from employer interference, restraint or
coercion.' A labor organization which represented a majority of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit was made the exclusive
5. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin ct al., 245 N. Y. 260, 264, 157 N. E.
130, 132 (1927); nterborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin et al., 247 N.Y. 65, 74, 75, 79,
159 N. E. 863, 867, 869 (1928).
6. 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63, 67 (1932).
7. Ibid.
S. Subdiv. 10 (c). For a discusison of early decisions involving C.P.A. § 976-a, see
Galenson and Spector, The New York Labor-Injunction Statute and the Courts, 42 Cor.
L. Rv. 51 (1942).
9. Subdiv. 10 (a).
10. NLRA § 7; NYSLRA § 703.
1951]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
representative of all employees in the unit," and the employer was placed
under a legal duty to recognize and negotiate with the majority repre-
sentative,'2 and no other.' 3 "Company unions," that is, organizations
dominated or sponsored by an employer, were prohibited,14 the closed
shop and other forms of union security were barred except to majority
representatives, 5 and the employer was prohibited from discriminating
against employees because of their union affiliation or activities.'" Both
acts provided election machinery to determine whether a majority of the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit desired to be represented
by a particular union.' 7
The enactment of the NLRA and NYSLRA thus substantially
changed the legal background against which the Stillwell case had been
decided. The employer could no longer "patronize" a particular union,
nor could he establish, and contract with, a company dominated union.
He was placed under legal compulsion to recognize and negotiate in good
faith with a bona fide labor organization freely chosen by his employees
as their representative.
During the first few years following the enactment of the NLRA and
NYSLRA, the New York courts generally considered themselves bound
by the Stillwell decision. The controversies involved were held to be
"labor disputes" within the meaning of C.P.A. § 876-a and injunctions
were denied.'
Where one of the unions had been certified by the NLRB or NYSLRB,
the reluctance of the courts to follow the Stillwell case was more clearly
manifested. In Stalban v. Friedman et al.,' 9 the court, at Special Term,
11. NLRA § 9 (a); NYSLRA § 705 (1).
12. NLRA §8(5); NYSLRA §704(6).
13. Medo Photo Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 683 (1944); N.L.R.B. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1936) ; Gulf Oil Co. v. Smallman et a., 270 App.
Div. 129, 58 N.Y. S.2d 495 (2d Dep't 1945).
14. NLRA § 8 (2); NYSLRA § 704 (3).
15. NLRA § 8 (3); NYSLRA § 704 (5). The Taft-Hartley Act, of course, prohibits
closed shop contracts and permits lesser forms of union security only after authorization
by the employees in a Board election. Taft-Hartley Act §§ 8 (a) (3), 9 (e).
16. NLRA § 8 (3) ; NYSLRA § 704 (4) (5).
17. NLRA § 9; NYSLRA § 705.
18. Buy-Wise Markets, Inc. v. Winokur et al., 167 Misc. 235, 2 N.Y. S. 2d 854 (Sup. Ct.
1938) ; Bergman et al. v. Levenson et al., 13 N.Y. S. 2d 955 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Brook-Maid
Food Co. v. Goldberg, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Wishnetzky Food Co. et al. v.
Osman et al., 27 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Contra: Spinner et al. v. Doe et al., 13
N.Y. S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Where the rival unions were locals affiliated with the
same parent organization, it was held that no labor dispute was involved. Silver Dollar
Bake Shop v. Weissman, 27 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Contra: Miller et al. v.
Gallagher et al., 176 Misc. 647, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
19. 171 Misc. 106, 11 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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distinguished the Stillwell case on the ground of the changes resulting
from the enactment of the NYSLRA, found that no labor dispute existed,
and enjoined all picketing. The Appellate Division, First Department,
reversed in a brief per curiam opinion,' stating that the record disclosed
a labor dispute was involved and, as the plaintiff had failed to comply
with the requirements of § 876-a, no injunctive relief could be granted.
It added: "The question is not affected by the fact, if it be a fact, that
the State Labor Relations Board has held that the union whose members
are now employed by the plaintiff is the proper agency for collective
bargaining. ') 21
In Euclid Candy Co. v. Summa et al.,- - the employer and two rival
unions signed an agreement providing for an NLRB election, and further
providing that the successful union would receive a closed shop contract
and that the defeated union would not strike during the term of the
contract. After the successful union had been certified by the NLRB,
a closed shop contract was executed. A number of employees who were
members of the rival union refused to join the certified union and went
on strike. Special Term held that the certification, "following an election
duly held by [the NLRB] pursuant to the agreements above referred
to, brought that labor dispute to a conclusion. ' The Special Term
opinion in Stalban v. Friedman et al., -4 which had not yet been reversed,
was cited. Since the purpose of the strike was to induce a breach of the
contract made pursuant to the agreement entered into by both unions, a
temporary injunction was granted. The Appellate Division, Second
Department, affirmed without opinion.'
In the Euclid case, the strike by the unsuccessful union was in vio-
lation of its agreement with the employer and the certified union, a factor
not.present in the Stalban case. C.P.A. § 876-a, 1 (a) expressly pro-
20. 259 App. Div. 520, 19 N.Y.S.2d 978 (lst Dep't 1940). See also Fairbanks Cube
Steak House v. Viera et al., 259 App. Div. 804, 20 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1st Dep't 1940), in
which no opinion was written. The facts may be found in Brook-Mlaid Food Co. v.
Goldberg, 21 N.Y.S.2d 9S4 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
21. 259 App. Div. 520, 521, 19 N.Y.S.2d 978, 979 (1st Dep't 1940). Actually the
contracting union had not been certified. Petitions filed with the NYSLRB by the employer
and the contracting union were dismissed on the ground that no question or controversy
concerning representation of employees was involved, as it was conceded that the contracting
union represented the employees and that the defendant unions did not. Old Russian Bear
Restaurant, 1 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 977 (1938).
22. 174 Misc. 19, 19 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 1031, 21 N.Y.S.2d
614 (2d Dep't 1940).
23. 174 Misc. 19, 21, 19 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
24. 171 Myisc. 106, 11 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1939).




vides that no injunction shall issue except after findings that ". . . a
breach of any contract not contrary to public policy has been threatened
or committed ...." Thus, even under § 876-a, a limited form of injunc-
tion could have been granted despite the existence of a "labor dispute."
1940-1950
In 1940 a dispute arose between two unions of retail shoe clerks con-
cerning the employees of the Florsheim Shoe Company. The NYSLRB,
after a hotly contested election, certified the successful union as repre-
sentative of the employees.2" The intense rivalry between the unions
continued and spread rapidly. Each union picketed stores previously
organized by the other. A number of injunction suits were instituted
and, in every case, the Supreme Court granted injunctive relief, declaring
that the picketing was retaliatory, malicious, and wholly unrelated to
terms and conditions of employment; that no labor dispute was involved
and C.P.A. § 876-a inapplicable."
Two of the cases, Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's
Union et al.,2" and Dinny & Robbins, Inc., v. Davis,2 were carried to
the Court of Appeals. In each, the Court of Appeals affirmed the injunc-
tive relief granted by the Supreme Court. Both decisions were by a split
court (4-3).
In the Florsheim case, the contracting union had been certified by the
NYSLRB3 ° and there had been violence, mass picketing, and the use of
"misleading" signs by the defendant union. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed a temporary injunction against all picketing. The majority de-
clared: "On the record here presented it is impossible for the respondents
successfully to maintain that any 'labor dispute' between plaintiffs and
defendants theretofore existing under section 876-a of the Civil Practice
Act survived the certification by the Labor Relations Board of the col-
lective bargaining agent for plaintiffs' employees and the execution of the
26. The Florsheim Shoe Store Co., 3 N.Y. S. L. R. B. 296 (1940).
27. Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union et al., 24 N.Y. S. 2d 923
(Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd, 262 App. Div. 769, 27 N.Y. S. 2d 883 (2d Dep't 1941), rev'd, 288
N.Y. 188, 42 N. E. 2d 480 (1942) (temporary injunction) ; Dinny & Robbins Inc. v. Davis,
290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E. 2d 280 (1943), reversing, 264 App. Div. 375, 35 N.Y. S. 2d 598
(1st Dep't 1942) (after trial); Regal Shoe Co. v. Doyle et al., 179 Misc. 696, 39 N.Y. S. 2d
666 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (after trial); London Character Shoe Corp. et al. v. Davis et al., 31
N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 865, 32 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1st Dep't
1942) (temporary injunction); The Coward Shoe, Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union
et al., 177 Misc. 708, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (temporary injunction).
28. 288 N.Y. 188, 42 N.E.2d 480 (1942).
29. 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E.2d 280 (1943).
30. The Florsheim Shoe Store Co., 3 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 296 (1940).
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collective bargaining contract."3' The picketing was said to be "malicious,
coercive, and accompanied by acts of intimidation ... for the purpose
o.. Of ruining plaintiffs' business, property and good will. It was un-
lawful for defendants falsely to represent... that plaintiffs were unfair
to organized labor, that a labor dispute existed between the plaintiffs
and their employees and that all plaintiffs' employees were out on
strike."32 The Stillwell case was distinguished on the grounds of vio-
lence and the change in state policy resulting from the enactment of
the NYSLRA and C.P.A. § 876-a 3
In the Dinny & Robbins case, the contracting union had not been
certified and the picketing, by one person at a time, was peaceful. The
placard bore the statement "Dinny & Robbins Shoes are unfair to the
Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, Local 1115-F-R.C.I.P.A., American
Federation of Labor."3 4 Trial Term granted a permanent injunction
prohibiting picketing unless the sign was changed to read, "This is no
strike. All employees of Dinny & Robbins, Inc., are regular members of
Local 1268 C.I.O., not members of Local 1115-F-R.C.I.P.A., A. F. of
The majority of the Court of Appeals stated that the placard falsely
"implied" that plaintiff's employees were on strike and that plaintiff was
"unfair to organized labor," and, hence, that the limited injunction was
proper, citing Angelos v. MesevichzY C.P.A. § 876-a was held to be
inapplicable on the ground that it "was not designed as an instrument
to promote and protect strife between rival labor groups or to injure
or destroy the good will and business of innocent employers against whom
there was no complaint concerning wages or working conditions solely
because they refused to take sides with one group as against the other.' 37
31. Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union et al., 28S N.Y. 188,
200, 42 N.E. 2d 480, 485 (1942). But see, under Norris-LaGuardia Act and NLRA, United
States v. Building and Construction Trades Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1940) ; American Chain
& Cable Co. v. Truck Drivers Union, 68 F. Supp. 54 (D.N.J. 1946).
32. Florshein Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union et al., 283 N.Y. 18S,
201, 42 N.E. 2d 480, 485 (1942).
33. Ibid.
34. 290 N.Y. 101, 104, 48 N.E.2d 280, 281 (1943).
35. Ibid. Cf. Edjomac Amusement Corp. v. Empire State Motion Picture Operators'
Union et al, 273 N.Y. 647, 8 N.E.2d 329 (1937), reversing, 247 App. Div. 879 (1st Dep't
1936), where the union had picketed with signs that read: "An Appeal. Don't patronize
this theatre. It does not employ members of Empire State Theatrical Stage Employees
Union." An injunction had been granted prohibiting picketing unless there were added to
the signs words that plaintiff "employs union labor to operate motion picture machines."
The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed without opinion and dismissed the complaint.
36. 289 N.Y. 498, 46 N.E.2d 903 (1943).
37. 290 N.Y. 101, 106, 48 N.E.2d 280, 282 (1943). But see, under Norris-LaGuardia
1951]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States."
In November, 1943, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
Angelos v. Mesevick, 9 which had been cited in the Court of Appeals'
decision in the Dinny & Robbins case. Angelos, the owner of a small
cafeteria, had made all his employees partners in the business in order
to stop picketing. The union continued to picket, peacefully, with signs
that "This place is unfair to organized labor, please help us." 40 The
Trial Court found that the signs were misleading in that they "tend to
create the impression that plaintiffs are unfair to organized labor and
that these pickets were previously employed by the plaintiffs. 41
The majority of the Court of Appeals held that as the cafeteria was
operated without employees there was no labor dispute, that accordingly
§ 876-a was inapplicable and an injunction against all picketing was
proper. The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously reversed
and remanded the case. In a brief opinion, the Court said: " ... . a state
cannot exclude working men in a particular industry from putting their
case to the public in a peaceful way 'by drawing the circle of economic
competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only
an employer and those directly employed by him,' " and that the" [r) ight
to free speech in the future cannot be forfeited because of dissociated
acts of past violence.. .. ' Still less can the right to picket itself be taken
away merely because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse
falling far short of violence occurring in the course of that picketing. 42
Thereafter, when the Florsheim case was tried on the merits, the trial
court granted a permanent injunction against all picketing. On appeal,
however, the Appellate Division, Second Department, limited the scope
of the injunction to violence and misleading signs 43 citing the Angeloy
case and other decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.44
Act and NLRA, Fur Workers Union et al. v. Fur Workers Union, et al, 105 F. 2d I (D. C.
Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 308 U.S. 522 (1939).
38. Davis et al. v. Dinny & Robbins, Inc., 319 U.S. 774 (1942). An interesting side
light to the Dinny & Robbins case is that the defendant union recovered damages against
the plaintiff because the temporary injunction was broader than the final injunction affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Dinny & Robbins, Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union et al.,
180 Misc. 643, 41 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
39. 320 U.S. 293 (1943), reversing and remanding, 289 N.Y. 498, 46 N.E. 2d 903
(1943).
40. 289 N.Y. 498, 506, 46 N.E.2d 903, 907 (1943).
41. Id. at 502, 46 N. E. 2d at 905.
42. 320 U.S. 293, 296 (1943).
43. Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union et al., 269 App. Div. 757
(2d Dep't), amended and affirmed, 269 App. Div. 850, 54 N.Y. S. 2d 788 (2d Dep't 1945).
44. American Federation of Labor et al. v. Swing et al., 312 U.S. 321 (1941) ; Bakery
Drivers Local et al. v. Wohl et a!., 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
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That same year, 1945, the Appellate Division, First Department,
affirmed a similar injunction against false signs in Sacks Quality Furni-
ture Inc. v. Hensley 45 The employer had a contract with a certified
union covering all its employees. A petition by the defendant union,
seeking to represent the salesmen as a separate unit, had been denied
by the NYSLRB 40 The salesmen then picketed with signs that the
certified union was a "company union." The Appellate Division, affirming
the injunction against false signs, held that although no labor dispute
was involved, "the defendant, a rival union, may, in the exercise of the
right of free speech, by peaceful and truthful methods of picketing,
attempt to win to itself the allegiance of members of the Association who
are employees of the plaintiff. 4 7
For a few years, again, a regular pattern was established. The courts
continued to hold that the issuance of a labor board certification, or the
execution of a collective bargaining agreement "terminated" any labor
dispute within the meaning of C.P.A. § 876-a but, generally, they limited
injunctions to prohibiting violence and misleading signs4 Attempts to
enlarge the rule to include other types of situations, were rejected. Where
a representation proceeding concerning the conflicting claims of rival
unions was pending undetermined, it was held that a labor dispute
existed 9 Where only one union was involved, labor disputes were found
to exist although the union had been defeated in a board-conducted
election,.1 or the employer's petition had been dismissed on tie union's
concession that it did not represent a majority of the employees,!" or
where there had been no board proceeding but the employer had "offered"
an election.52
1950-1951
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Building
Service Employees et al. v. Gazzam,5 3 a case originating in the State of
45. 269 App. Div. 264, 55 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Ist Dep't 1945).
46 Sachs Quality Furniture, Inc., S N.Y. S. L. R. B. 66, 72 (1945).
47. 269 App. Div. 264, 267, 55 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (Ist Dep't 1945).
48. Siegel, Inc. v. Rosenzweig et a!., 85 N.Y. S. 2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Theatre Co. v.
Lederfine, 24 L. R. R. M. 2273 (Sup. Ct. 1949). Contra: Fay Loevin Apparel Shops, Inc. v.
Harlem Labor Union, Inc., 92 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd or rehearing, 25
L.R.R. M. 2088 (Sup. CL 1949). Cf. Madison & 40th, Inc. v. Townsend, 24 L. R. R. I.
2601 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
49. Oppenheim Collins & Co. v. Carnes, 81 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Grossman
v. McDonough, 27 L.R.R.M. 2056 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
50. Yonkers New System Laundry, Inc. v. Simon et al., 18 N.Y. S. 2d 73 (Sup. Ct.
1940), modified, 259 App. Div. 912, 20 N.Y. S.2d 74 (2d Dep't 1940).
51. Stein's Wines and Liquors, Inc. v. O'Grady, 75 N.Y. S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
52. Carl Ahlers, Inc. v. Papa et al., 272 App. Div. 905 (Ist Dep't 1947).
53. 339 U.S. 532 (1949).
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Washington, set the ball rolling once more. There, the union had de-
manded a closed shop contract. The employer rejected the union's de-
mand after the employees, in a private poll, had voted against joining
the union. The union then picketed with signs that the employer was
"Unfair to Organized Labor." The Supreme Court sustained a state court
injunction on the ground that "Picketing of an employer to compel him
to coerce his employees' choice of a bargaining representative is an
attempt to induce a transgression of this [State's] policy" 54 as expressed
in an anti-injunction statute similar to § 876-a.0 The statute declared
that "though [an employee] should be free to decline to associate with
his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing...
free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers. . . . " The
Court cautioned, however: "There is no contention that picketing di-
rected at employees for organization purposes would be violative of that
policy. The decree does not have that effect." 7
Exactly five weeks after the decision in the Gazzam case, the Appellate
Division, First Department, affirmed an injunction against all picketing
in Haber & Fink, Inc. v. "John Jones."58 A union, whose contract with
plaintiff had expired, engaged in mass demonstrations, violence and the
use of misleading signs after the employees had voted for "no union"
in an NYSLRB election. The union's contentions that it was picketing
(1) to persuade the employees to support it, (2) for a "members only"
contract, and (3) to publicize that plaintiff was now a non-union shop
were rejected; the first two as "specious" and the third on the ground
that plaintiff's shop was non-union through no fault of the plaintiff but
because of the "policy of the Labor Relations Act that there shall be
nonunion shops when the employees ... vote that it shall be so."" The
court expressly stated that the rule of the Florsheim and Dinny &
Robbins cases "applies where the [union's] objective is to nullify a labor
board election that has resulted in a vote for no union. 00
Shortly thereafter, in Pennock Co. v. Ferretti,01 Special Term, citing
the Haber & Fink case enjoined all picketing by a union which had
54. Id. at 538.
55. WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7612 (Supp. 1940).
56. See note 55 supra.
57. Building Services Employees et al. v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539 (1949).
58. 277 App. Div. 176, 98 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1st Dep't 1950).
59. Id. at 180, 98 N.Y. S. 2d at 396.
60. Id. at 181, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
61. 125 N.Y.L.J. 956, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 1951). Cf. Mele Mfg. Co. v. Doe,
125 N.Y.L.J. 1530, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 1951), where, after the NLRB had vacated an
election in which the union had been defeated, a labor dispute was held to exist.
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requested recognition, where the employer's petition to the NLRB had
been withdrawn without prejudice on the union's concession that it did
not represent a majority of the employees. The court said that the
picketing was "part of a plan to avoid a labor board election" and, there-
fore, unlawful. 2
In LaManna v. O'Grady, et al.03 the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, again reviewed a case in which the employees had voted for "no
union." Here, however, the picketing was peaceful and orderly. The
court again held that the union's defeat in the election "ended the
dispute," 4 and affirmed an injunction against all picketing. It added,
however, that it would be permissible for the union to picket, provided
the information given the public included the fact "that the nonunion
status of plaintiff's store is a matter of the employees' choice. .... "1
Accordingly, the affirmance was without prejudice to an application to
Special Term for modification of the injunction. Thereafter, upon such
application, the injunction was modified accordingly."
Analysis of Current Doctrine
It is apparent that the pendulum has swung its full arc. The "pro-
union" state anti-injunction and labor relations acts sounded the knell
of the "pro-union" Stillwell doctrine. The same court which once said
the existence of a labor dispute "is not affected by the fact... that the
State Labor Relations Board has held that the union . . . is the proper
agency for collective bargaining"0 7 now holds that there is no labor
dispute if the employees vote for "no union."08 The first step has been
taken to extend further the new doctrine to cases in which a represen-
tation petition is withdrawn or dismissed on the union's concession of
non-majority status.
The current enlargement of the Florsheim and Dnny & Robbins
decisions warrants re-examination of those cases. As the extension fol-
lowed immediately after, and apparently was based upon, the decision
62. 125 N.Y. L. J. 956, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 1951).
63. 278 App. Div. 77, 103 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Ist Dep't 1951).
64. Id. at 78, 103 N.Y. S.2d at 478.
65. Id. at 79, 103 N.Y. S. 2d at 478. Cf. Edjomac Amusement Corp. v. Empire State
Motion Picture Operators' Union et al., 273 N.Y. 647, 8 N.E. 2d 329 (1937). See also Sachs
Quality Furniture, Inc. v. Hensley, 269 App. Div. 264, 55 N.Y. S. 2d 450 (lst Dep't 1945).
'We do not mean to hold that the defendant must on its signs set forth all the facts
relating to the proceedings before the Labor Board. We only hold that it must abstain
from statements which must necessarily result in deception of the public." Id. at 268, 55
N.Y.S.2d at 453.
66. 125 N.Y.L.J. 1389, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 1951).




of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Gazzam case, the effect
of that decision necessarily must be considered. Finally, in so far as
the New York decisions overlap, exceed or contravene § 8b(4) (C) of
the Taft-Hartley Act, consideration must be given to the effect of that
Act on the jurisdiction of state courts in labor disputes which affect
interstate commerce.
Many of the difficulties which have characterized the development and
application of the current New York doctrine may be traced to the use
of broad language to the effect that a certification "ends the labor dispute."
The "question or controversy concerning representation" presented to
a labor board in a representation proceeding is narrow, indeed, compared
to the breadth of a labor dispute as defined in C.P.A. § 876-a. A repre-
sentation proceeding is a non-adversary, fact-finding investigation de-
signed to ascertain whether a union represents a majority of the em-
ployees in an appropriate bargaining unit."9 It has no concern with
many activities or controversies which clearly fall within the broader
definition of labor dispute in § 876-a, such as organizational picketing,
controversies as to economic conditions1 ° or contract rights.1 1
Even in disputes concerning representation there is a vital distinction
between C.P.A. § 876-a and the labor relations acts. A controversy con-
cerning representation may exist under § 876-a although the union repre-
sents none of the employees of the employer concerned. 2 But a question
of representation under the labor relations acts exists only where the
union claims, expressly or by necessary implication from its act, to rep-
resent a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit."'
Absent such a claim of majority status, the petition is dismissed on the
ground that no question or controversy concerning representation exists.7 4
One of the reasons for such dismissals is that an employer should not be
68. Haber and Fink, Inc. v. "John Jones," et al, 277 App. Div. 176, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 393
(1st Dep't 1950).
69. Southern Steamship Co. v. N. L. R. B., 120 F. 2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941); S BaxNjAm,
ADMIn ISTRATIV ADUDICATIoN IN Naw YORK 162 (1942).
70. Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co. et al., 296 N.Y. 26, 69 N.E.2d 233 (1946);
May's Furs and Ready-to-Wear, Inc. et al. v. Bauer et al., 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E. 2d 279
(1940); Schaler et al. v. Horowitz et al., 99 N. Y. S. 2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
71. Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach et al, 279. N.Y. 323, 18 N.E. 2d 294 (1938); Johnson
et al. v. Bee Line, Inc. et al., 262 App. Div. 762, 27 N.Y. S. 2d 732 (2d Dep't 1941);
F. Everett, Inc. et al. v. Della Penna et al., 168 Misc. 589, 6 N.Y. S. 2d 630 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
72. See note 70 supra.
73. Joseph Kappel, 13 N.Y.S.L.R.B. No. 116 (Oct. 6, 1950); Hamilton's L't'd., 93
N. L. R. B. No. 193 (Mar. 30, 1951); Empire Rollerdrome, Inc., 14 N.Y.S. L. R. B. No.
40 (Feb. 15, 1951).
74. See note 73 supra.
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permitted "to forestall the effects of a union to organize his employees
by seeking a premature election in the midst of the union's organizational
campaign.
Nor does a certification necessarily end either the question of repre-
sentation or the labor dispute. Employers sometimes challenge a certifi-
cation, and refuse to bargain with the certified union, on the ground that
the unit found by the Board was inappropriate,7 that the board's rulings
on challenged ballots or eligibility of voters were erroneous or that the
election was improperly conducted, 7 that the union had coerced, or
fraudulently induced, the employees to vote for it,78 or that the union
had subsequently lost its majority status2 9
A union which has been defeated in a board election may also claim
that the certification was erroneous for similar reasons. Unions, however,
have been unable to secure judicial review of NLRB determinations in
representation proceedings."0 In New York, the question whether a union
may secure judicial review of a representation proceeding has not been
finally decided.8'
In other cases, the certified union and the employer may be unable
to reach agreement and a strike may result.
Even where there are existing contracts, labor disputes may exist or
arise over interpretation, coverage or modification 2 Suits by employers,
or unions, for specific performance of contracts consistently have been
held to involve labor disputes. 3 Where the employer, during the term
75. Veteran and Affiliated Package Stores Assn., Inc., 12 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 164, 167 (1949).
76. May Department Stores Co. v. N.L.R.B., 326 U.S. 376 (1945); In the matter
of N.Y.S.L.R.B. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. et at., 295 N.Y. 839, 66 N.E.2d 853
(1946), affirming, 269 App. Div. 934 (1st Dep't 1945), affirning, 183 Mimc. 1054, 52 N.Y.S.
2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
77. Southern Steamship Co. v. N.L.R.B. et al., 316 U.S. 31 (1942); N.L.R.B. v.
Conlon Bros. Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1951); N.L.R.B. v. Worcester Woolen
Mills Corp., 170 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denked, 336 U.S. 903 (1949).
78. N.L.R.B. v. Worcester Woolen Mills Corp., supra note 77; Wilson Athletic Goods
Manufacturing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 164 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1947).
79. N.L.R.B. v. Worcester Woolen Mills Corp., 170 F.2d 13 (Ist Cir. 1948).
80. Inland Empire Council v. MIllis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945).
81. Cf. Matter of Wallach's, Inc. v. Boland, 253 App. Div. 371, 2 N.Y.S.2d 179
(1st Dep't), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 345, 14 N.E.2d 381 (1938); Cody v. Kelley, 184 Mic.
150, 53 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. CL 1945).
82. Vim Electronic Co. v. Solomon, 67 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. CL 1947).
83. Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach et al., 279 N.Y. 323, 18 N.E.2d 294 (1938); Uneeda
Credit Clothing Stores v. Briskin, 14 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1939); F. Everett, Inc. v.
Della Penna et al., 168 Misc. 589, 6 N.Y.S. 2d 630 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Murphy v. Ralph,
165 Misc. 335, 299 N.Y. Supp. 270 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
1951]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of a collective agreement, negotiates,8 4 or executes a contract,"" with a
rival union, labor disputes were held to exist.
Thus, it is apparent that determination of the limited question pre-
sented in a labor board representation proceeding does not necessarily
"end" labor disputes as they are defined in C.P.A. § 876-a. And analysis
of the majority opinion in the Florsheim case reveals that the broad
implications ascribed to it in subsequent lower court decisions may be
unjustified. 0 The opinion expressly referred to the combination of
"ccertification . . . and the execution of the collective bargaining
contract.' 87 The picketing was found to be "malicious" and unlawful,
"under the circumstances and conditions indicated."88, And, in distin-
guishing the Stillwell case, it was pointed out that "the methods of
selection of a collective bargaining agent had not then been declared by
the Legislature as we now find it"; the employer in the Stillwell case
had "voluntarily entered into a contract . . . with one union to the
exclusion of its rival.18 9
In Dinny & Robbins, Inc. v. Davis, et al." although the employer
had a contract with the union which represented all the employees, there
had been no prior board proceeding or certification. This distinction be-
tween the Florsheim and Dinny & Robbins cases supports the conclusion
that it was not the certification in the Florsheim case, which, ipso facto,
"ended" the dispute.
The NLRA, NYSLRA and Taft-Hartley Act all imposed upon em-
ployers a duty to bargain collectively with a union which represents a
majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit."' An em-
ployer is required to approach the negotiations with a sincere resolve to
reach an agreement,92 and to execute a written contract if agreement is
reached.13 The duty to recognize the certified representative carries the
84. Johnson et al. v. Bee Line, Inc. et al., 262 App. Div. 762, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 732 (2d Dep't
1941).
85. See, J. Rabinowitz & Sons, Inc. v. Devery et al., 33 N.Y. S. 2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
86. See, Serval Slide Fasteners, Inc. v. Molfetta et al., 188 Misc. 787, 70 N.Y. S. 2d 411
(Sup. Ct. 1947). "The decision by the Labor Board following the election meant that that
'labor dispute' was officially ended forever." Id. at 790, 70 N.Y. S.2d at 415.
87. Florsheim Shoe Store Co. Inc. v. Shoe Salesmen's Union et al., 288 N. Y. 188, 200,
42 N.E. 2d 480, 485 (1942) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 201, 42 N.E. 2d at 485 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 201, 42 N. E. 2d at 486 (emphasis added).
90. 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E.2d 280 (1943).
91. NLRA § 8(5) ; Taft-Hartley Act § 8a (5) ; NYSLRA § 704 (b).
92. N.L.R.B. v. Boss Manufacturing Co., 118 F. 2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941); Matter of
N.Y.S.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 179 Misc. 298, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 858 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 878 (2d Dep't 1943).
93. H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514 (1941); N.Y.S.L.R.B. v. Roosevelt
Chevrolet Co., 177 Misc. 468, 30 N.Y. S. 2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Taft-Hartley Act § 8 (d).
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correlative duty to recognize no other. 4 Accordingly, where the objective
of picketing is to compel recognition by an employer who has a contract
with a certified rival union, its purpose is unlawful, for it seeks to induce
or compel a violation of law.
The effect of an unlawful purpose had been considered by the Court
of Appeals in Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, et al.o3 and American Gdld
of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, et alO both decided before the
Florsheim and Dinny & Robbins cases. "Unless the objective of the
defendant-union is a lawful one, this controversy is not a 'labor dispute'
in the sense of section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act." 7 The validity
of this doctrine was vigorously challenged by a minority of the court)' s
Nevertheless, the decision constitutes the law of the State and, in view of
the obvious distinctions between the limited question determined in a
representation proceeding and the broad definition of a "labor dispute,"
provides a more reasonable rationale for the Florsheim decision.
Where an employer has a contract with an uncertified union, the same
considerations are applicable. Certification by the NLRB or NYSLRB
is not a condition precedent to the employer's duty to recognize and
negotiate a contract with a union which represents a majority of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit." Accordingly, a strike or
94. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678 (1944) ; N.L.R.B. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
95. 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 615 (1941).
96. 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123 (1941).
97. Id. at 231, 36 N.E.2d at 125. See also Lubliner et ai. v. Reinlib et al., 184 Misc.
472, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
98. See Lehman, C. J., in American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. et al. v. Petrillo et al.,
286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123 (1941): "I still do not understand how a statute which
expressly provides that in a case 'involving or growing out of a labor dispute,' acts specified
therein, may not be enjoined 'on the ground that the persons engaged therein constitute
an unlawful combination or conspiracy or on any other grounds whatsoever' can be con-
strued in manner which would exclude from the statutory definition of a qabor dispute'
any dispute with a labor union unless 'the objective of the labor union is a lawful one."
Id. at 232, 36 N.E.2d at 126 (dissenting opinion). Language of the Court of Appeals in
the Bauer case, would seem contrary to the holding in the Opera on Tour and Petrillo cases.
There, in rejecting a contention that extreme violence removed the case from the concept
of a labor dispute, it was said: "The fallacy of this argument is revealed by the fact that
where a defendant has not been guilty of unlawful activities, perforce no injunction would
issue even in the absence of section 876-a. The need for statutory safeguards can exist only
where a defendant is guilty of some wrongdoing and is liable to injunctive restraint. The
effect of the statute is to regulate the procedure by which an injunction may be obtained
and to limit the scope of the relief which may be granted. The statute is rendered meaning-
less unless it is allowed to operate in those cases where plaintiff is entitled to some relief."'
May's Furs and Ready-To-Wear, Inc. et al. v. Bauer et al., 282 N.Y. 331, 341, 26 N.E.2d
279, 284 (1940). See also Galenson and Spector, The New York Labor-Injunction Statute
and the Courts, 42 COL. L. Rzv. 51, 66-8, 74 (1942).
99. N.L.R.B. v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1940);
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picketing to compel the -employer to violate his legal duty, again, is for an
unlawful purpose. Here, however, the problem is more complex. In the
absence of a labor board certification, the union's majority status at the
time of execution of the contract, and hence the validity of the contract,
is subject to challenge.100 And that question is one for determination
by the appropriate labor relations board, not the courts.10 1
The New York courts have proceeded on the presumption that the
contract is valid until the appropriate board holds otherwise.102 This
"presumption," however, may present a vexatious question if the
picketing union files a charge with the board challenging the validity of
the contract. In the past unions which had filed charges with the
NYSLRB, have applied to the courts for injunctions requiring main-
tenance of the status quo pending board determination. But such
applications consistently have been denied by the courts on the ground
that the board's jurisdiction is exclusive and that the courts could not
grant relief without prejudging the very issues before the board.100
In those cases, the injunctive relief sought was ancillary to, and in aid of,
the board's complaint. It would seem inconsistent, therefore, to grant
injunctive relief in favor of the employer on the basis of a contract, the
validity of which has been challenged in a complaint issued by the board.
Additional problems may also arise in situations where it is urged that
an existing contract does not "bar" a representation petition filed by a
rival union because the contract is about to expire,104 is of unreasonable
duration, 05 has been reopened by the parties thereto,100 has been pre-
N.Y. S. L. R. B. v. Roosevelt Chevrolet Co., 177 Misc. 468, 30 N.Y. S. 2d 381 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
100. N.L.R.B. v. Graham et al, 159 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1947); N.Y.S.L.R.B. v.
Club Transportation Corp. et al., 275 App. Div. 536, 90 N.Y. S.2d 367 (2d Dep't 1949).
101. Levinsohn v. Joint Board et al., 299 N.Y. 454, 87 N.E. 2d 510 (1949).
102. Levinsohn v. Joint Board et al., supra note 101; Loevin Apparel Shops, Inc. v.
Harlem Labor Union, Inc., 92 N.Y. S. 2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
103. Domanick et al. v. Triboro Coach Corp., 259 App. Div. 657, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 306
(1st Dep't 1940) (suit to enjoin discharges under allegedly invalid closed shop contract).
Weir v. Mosale Realty, Inc., 83 N.Y.S. 2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Beazer v. Bluttal et al.,
186 Misc. 234, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Gomeringer v. Natrel Realty Corp. et al.,
64 N.Y. S. 2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Cammarata v. Bargus Realty Co., 191 Misc. 467, 77
N. Y. S. 2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (suits to enjoin alleged discriminatory evictions of building
superintendents).
104. Round California Chain Corp., 64 N. L. R. B. 242 (1945); Walter Jansen & Son,
63 N.L.R.B. 121 (1945); Peerless Stages, Inc., 62 N.L.R.B. 1514 (1945).
105. Universal Pictures Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 52 (1944); Dolese & Shepard Co., 57
N.L.R.B. 1598 (1944); Port Costa Packing Co., 46 N.L.R.B. 931 (1943).
106. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 79 N. L. R. B. 337 (1948); Shopwell Foods, Inc.,
87 N.L.R.B. 1112 (1949); Falcon Manufacturing Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 467 (1947). Cl.
Western Electric Co., 94 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (Apr. 27, 1951).
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maturely extended,1 7 or the contracting union has become defunct. 08
In cases where no majority representative has been selected by the
employees and there is neither certification nor an existing contract, a
wholly different type of situation is presented. In such cases, of course,
there can be no contention that picketing is for the unlawful purpose of
compelling the employer to violate his legal duty to recognize a majority
representative. The question remains whether it is for any other unlawful
purpose.
The Court of Appeals, in May's Furs and Ready-to-Wear, Inc.
et al. v. Bauer et al.,'0 9 held that a labor dispute existed within the mean-
ing of C.P.A. § 876-a although none of the plaintiff's employees was a
member of the union. Legal justification, under the prima fade tort
theory,110 was found to exist in that "Although the members of the
defendant union are not the employees of plaintiff employer, no less is
their direct interest in the labor policy of an employer who is engaged in
the same industry as they are. It is common knowledge that the conditions
of employment prevailing in a given establishment cannot be insulated
against the influence of different standards which may exist elsewhere in
that industry. M
In the May's case, there had been no prior representation proceeding.
The finding that the union did not represent the employees was made
by the court in the first instance. However, the fact that the finding is
made by a board, rather than the court, would not constitute an adequate
basis for distinction. The method of ascertaining the union's non-
representative status manifestly has no bearing on the economic or legal
justification for the union's actions. The absence of prior board proceed-
ings did not prevent a determination in the May's case that a labor
dispute existed, nor did it prevent a contrary holding in the Dinny &
Robbins case. Clearly, then, the fact that a labor relations board, rather
than a court, has determined the union's non-majority status should
not occasion different legal consequences.
In Building Service Employees Union, et al. v. Gazzam,"-2 the Supreme
107. Modine Manufacturing Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1360 (1950); Indiana Dfek Co., 82
N.L.R.B. 103 (1949).
108. Koppers Company, 72 N.L.R.B. 31 (1947); Perfection Spring and Equipment
Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 590 (1947); Boston Machine Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 59 (1950).
109. 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E.2d 279 (1940).
110. See Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941).
111. May's Furs and Ready-to-Wear et al. v. Bauer et al, 282 N.Y. 331, 339, 26 N.E.2d
279, 283 (1940). A later case in which a labor dispute was held to exist, although the
union did not represent the employees, is Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 296 N.Y. 26,
69 N.E.2d 233 (1946).
112. 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
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Court of the United States affirmed an injunction against picketing,
stating: "An adequate basis for the instant decree is the unlawful
objective of the picketing, namely, coercion by the employer of the
employees' selection of a bargaining representative." ' The affirmance,
however, was qualified in two significant respects. First, the union had
demanded a contract which would have required the employees to join
the union against their express desires. "If respondent [employer] had
complied with petitioners' demands . . he would have thereby
coerced his employees" in violation of the state's statutory policy that
employees should be free to join or not to join unions free from in-
terference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor. 4
Second, the Court's opinion repeatedly emphasized that the decree
which it affirmed only enjoined picketing for the specified unlawful
purpose, and did not bar peaceful picketing "directed at employees for
organization purposes" or "any lawful purpose.
M 5
It may be that, under the principles of the Gazzam case, the dispute
is between the union and the employees, not the employer.11" Neverthe-
less, C.P.A. § 876-a specifically provides that a "labor dispute" includes
controversies between unions and employees.' That the plaintiff is not
a party to the dispute does not enable him to "by-pass the express
prohibition of § 876-a."M 8
Moreover, the NYSLRA, unlike the Taft-Hartley Act and the Wash-
ington statute in the Gazzam case, makes no mention of a right of
employees to "decline" to associate. Section 704(5) of the NYSLRA,
provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
encourage membership in any company union or discourage membership
in any labor organization." In this respect it differs too from the NLRA
113. Id. at 539.
114. Id. at 540.
115. Id. at 539. Also: "There was no injunction against picketing generally." Id. at 536.
"Peaceful picketing for any lawful purpose is not prohibited by the decree under review."
Id. at 539. "The Washington statute has not been construed by the Washington courts In
this case to prohibit picketing of workers by other workers." Ibid. "There is no contention
that picketing directed at employees for organization purposes would be violative of that
policy. The decree does not have that effect." Ibid.
116. Picketing the homes of non-striking or non-union employees has been enjoined as
occurring away from the situs of the dispute. Remington Rand, Inc. v. Crofoot, 248 App.
Div. 356, 359, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1025 (4th Dep't 1936), aff'd without opinion, 279 N.Y.
635, 18 N.E. 2d 37 (1938); Miller v. Gallagher, 176 Misc. 647, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 606 (Sup.
Ct. 1941). Quaere. Are such activities now permissible under the theory that the dispute Is
between the union and the employees, rather than between the union and the employer?
117. C.P.A. §876-a (10) (a).
118. Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 296 N.Y. 26, 31, 69 N.E. 2d 233, 234 (1946).
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which declared it unlawful for an employer to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.11 9
Assuming that New York policy is similar to that of the State of
Washington, it would seem, nevertheless, that, in the absence of a demand
for a contract requiring union membership,120 peaceful and truthful
organizational picketing, after dismissal or withdrawal of a representa-
tion proceeding, is not unlawful in purpose and hence involves a labor
dispute within C.P.A. § 876-a. Indeed, despite the recent restrictive
interpretations of Thornhill v. Alabama 12' such picketing probably is
still constitutionally protected. Even where such a contract has been
unlawfully demanded, it is doubtful, in view of the Supreme Court's
language in the Gazzam case, that picketing for other, and lawful
purposes, could be enjoined. The Court frequently has cautioned that
wherever it is possible to separate the legal from the illegal, injunctive
relief should be limited to prohibition of the latter only.'
Effect of the Taft-Hartley Act
There remains for consideration the effect of the Taft-Hartley Act
on state regulation of minority union strikes or picketing in disputes
which affect interstate commerce.m
The Taft-Hartley Act "preempts the field that the Act covers in so
far as commerce within the meaning of the Act is concerned."124 The
field covered is vast, both in the comprehensiveness of the regulation
and the extent to which federal power under the Commerce Clause was
119. NLRA § 8 (3).
120. If there is no majority representative, a "members only" contract is lawful. Hoover
Co., 90 N.L.R.B. No. 201 (Aug. 1, 1950). See also N.L.R.B. v. Reliable Newspaper
Delivery, Inc., 187 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1951); Electronics Equipment Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
No. 19, (Apr. 30, 1951).
121. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Cf. Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, Inc, 315 U.S. 722
(1942); Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) ; Teamsters Union
et al. v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
122. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 541, 547 (1945); Giboney v. Empire Storage
and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See also Mfay's Furs and Ready-to-Wear, Inc. et al. v.
Bauer et at., 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E.2d 279 (1940).
123. For general discussions of the problems of federal and state regulation of labor
relations, see Grady, Federal-State Problems of Jurisdiction, PocE- Dmcs or Tm NEw
Yopz UrevnERsrry SECOND ANNUAL CoNFERENCE ON LABOR (1949); Cox and Seidman,
Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211 (1950); Smith, The Taft-Hartley
Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 46 MIcr. L. Rrv. 593 (194S); Feldblum,
The Taft-Hartley Act, State Boards and State Courts, 120 N.Y.L.J. 1590, col. 1. (Dec.
20, 1948); Note, Overlapping Federal and State Regulation of Labor Relations, 15 U.
or CHI. L. REv. 362 (1948).




exercised. 20 Within that field, state regulation, even if consistent with
federal law, is forbidden.2 6 State regulation in an industry in which
the NLRB customarily asserts jurisdiction is precluded even though the
NLRB has never asserted jurisdiction over the particular employer. 2 7
Power to prevent unfair labor practices which affect interstate commerce
is vested exclusively in the NLRB, 12 s and the ban on state regulation is
applicable whether effected through board order, 129 court decree 0 or
legislative enactment."'
It seems clear, therefore, that state courts are deprived of jurisdiction
over minority union efforts to compel disregard of an NLRB certification,
for such activities violate section 8b (4) (C) of the Taft-Hartley Act
and thus come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Attempts to compel disregard of contracts with uncertified unions
again present a more difficult problem. There can be no violation of
§ 8b(4) (C) in the absence of an outstanding NLRB certification. 10 2
Since the Taft-Hartley Act does not specifically cover this type of situation
it may be urged that the states are free to act. The argument finds
support in § 8d .of the Taft-Hartley Act which requires a sixty day notice
of intention to terminate or modify a collective agreement and deprives
premature strikers of their status as employees. It may be said, therefore,
125. "Congress . . . saw fit to regulate labor relations to the full extent of its consti-
tutional power under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 388.
126. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 767, 775-6 (1947).
127. LaCrosse Telephone Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board et al., 336
U.S. 18 (1949).
128. Costaro v. Simons, 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E. 2d 454 (1951); Ryan v. Simons, 277
App. Div. 1000, 100 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1950); Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 27
L.R.R.M. 2576 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 4, 1951); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers
Union, 167 F. 2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 46 N. W. 2d 94 (Minn.
1950); Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Building and Construction Trade Council
et al., 93 F. Supp. 217 (D. Maine 1950); Reed Construction Co. v. Building Council, 27
L.R.R.M. 2161 (Miss. Ch. Feb. 22, 1950); Gladding & Co. v. Warehouse Union, 27
L. R.R.M. 2263 (Cal. Super. Jan. 12, 1951).
129. Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board et al., 338
U.S. 953 (1950).
130. Costaro v. Simons, 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E. 2d 454 (1951); Ryan v. Simons, 277
App. Div. 1000, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 18 (2d Dep't 1950); Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 27
L.R.R. M. 2576 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 4, 1951).
131. United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
132. Perry Norvell Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 225, 239 (1948). It has been held that § 8b (4) (C)
is not violated where the picketing is for purposes other than recognition. Douds v.
Retail Wholesale Department Store Union, 173 F. 2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949); Brown v. Retail
Shoe and Textile Salesmen's Union, 89 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Hoover Co., 90
N. L. R. B. No. 201 (Aug. 1, 1951). Cf. Retail Clerks, A. F. of L., 93 N. L. R. B. No. 272
(April 23, 1951). Where a union "assigned" its certification, § 8b (4) (C) is inapplicable.
Douds v. United Wire and Metal Workers Union, 86 F. Supp. 548 (S. D. N.Y. 1949).
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that as a minority union strike during the term of a contract is neither
protected nor prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, state action is not
precluded.113 Nevertheless, more detailed analysis would appear to
indicate a contrary conclusion.
Congress, in section 8b(4), specified what union objectives or purposes
shall be unlawful. It did not include all minority union efforts to obtain
recognition. On the contrary, it prohibited such activities only where a
majority representative had been certified by the NLRB, or where a
"secondary boycott" is involved. This limitation appears to have been
intentional. The original House bill would have prohibited strikes by
all uncertified unions and strikes "to compel an employer to violate any
law." 134 Manifestly, a much broader ban than that was eventually
enacted. The intention to distinguish between certified and uncertified
majority representatives is further emphasized by other provisions of §
8b(4). Certain secondary pressures are permissible only where there
is a certified representative.' - On the other hand, a refusal to cross a
picket line is permitted where the strike has been ratified by a union
which the employer "is required to recognize under this Act,"'", i.e., either
a certified or uncertified majority" representative.
Moreover, the comprehensive nature of the federal regulation of labor-
management disputes generally, and the extent of the field which has
been preempted, make it appear unlikely that Congress intended to
leave this small segment open to state regulation.1 7 Congress "spell[ed]
out with particularity those areas in which it desired state regulation to
be operative." 3" The provision in § 8(d), depriving premature strikers
of reinstatement rights, is a form of federal regulation applicable to
minority union strikes. "Congressional imposition of certain restrictions
on... [the] right to strike, far from supporting [state regulation] shows
that Congress has closed to state regulation the field of peaceful strikes
in industries affecting commerce.... And where, as here, the state seeks
to deny a federally guaranteed right which Congress itself restricted
only to a limited extent ... [the state regulation] is in conflict with
federal law."' 39
133. International Union, U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
245 (1949).
134. H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. § 12 (a) (3) (c) (1947).
135. Taft-Hartley Act § 8b(4) (B).
136. Id., proviso to § 8b (4).
137. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. S. L. R. B., 330 U.S. 767 (1947). See Cox and Seidman,
Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211 (1930).
138. Electric Railway Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S.
383 (1950), citing Taft-Hartley Act §§8 (d), 10 (a), 14 (b), 202 (c) and 203 (b).
139. Id. at 389.
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Where the employees have voted for no union, or where a representa-
tion proceeding has been withdrawn or dismissed on the union's concession
of non-majority status, the state courts again would appear to be without
jurisdiction. The Taft-Hartley Act "expressly safeguarded for employees
[in industries affecting commerce] the 'right . . . to engage in . . .
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection,' 'e.g. to strike,' "140 except as Congress itself
imposed limitations thereon. If a strike or picketing after dismissal or
withdrawal of an NLRB representation proceeding is "part of a plan
to avoid a labor board election"14' or to "nullify" the results thereof,142
that would seem particularly a matter of federal, not state, concern.
In Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, et al.," the Supreme Court reversed, without opinion, an order
of the Wisconsin Board which directed reinstatement of an employee
discharged for non-membership in a union even though his employment
was not covered by a union shop or similar contract. The grounds for
the reversal were a subject of considerable speculation . 44 The decision
was recently explained in Electric Railway Employees v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, et al., 45 where the Court said:
"Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act not only guarantees
the right of self-organization and the right to strike, but also guarantees
to individual employees the 'right to refrain from any or all of such
activities,' at least in the absence of a union shop or similar contractual
arrangement applicable to the individual. Since the NLRB was given
jurisdiction to enforce the rights of the employees, it was clear that the
Federal Act had occupied this field to the exclusion of state regulation.
Plankington and O'Brien 46 both show that states may not regulate in
respect to rights guaranteed by Congress in § 7.'147
Thus, whether the purpose of minority union picketing is to "nullify"
or "avoid" an NLRB election, or to compel an employer to coerce his
140. Id. at 387.
141. Pennock Co. v. Ferretti, 125 N.Y.L.J. 956, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 1951).
142. Haber & Fink, Inc. v. "John Jones," 277 App. Div. 176, 98 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1st
Dep't 1950).
143. 338 U.S. 953 (1950).
144. See Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. Rav. 211, 220
(1950).
145. 340 U.S. 383 (1950).
146. Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U. S.
953 (1950); United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
147. 340 U.S. 383, 390, n. 12 (1950). Building Service Employees' Union et al. v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950), involved the employees of a small hotel. The NLRB
has declined to assert jurisdiction in the hotel industry. Hotel Association of St. Louis,
92 N.L.R.B. No. 215 (Jan. 17, 1951). Accordingly no question of pre-emption was
presented.
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employees' choice of representatives, if interstate commerce is affected,
the case would appear to be subject to federal jurisdiction only.
CONCLUSION
In intrastate matters, state regulation is permissible within Constitu-
tional limits. However, the courts, in the great majority of cases, have
limited injunctive relief to prohibition of violence and misleading signs. 4 '
Inasmuch as such limited injunctions are permissible under the express
provisions of C.P.A. § 876-a,149 it would seem that, for all practical
purposes, the real effect of the current New York doctrine is to eliminate
the procedural safeguards of that section.
Where interstate commerce is affected, it would appear that the NLRB
has exclusive jurisdiction over minority union strikes and the state may
act only to prevent violencea; or the violation of some state law of general
application.'9 1
148. E.g., Dinny & Robbins v. Davis, 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E.2d 280 (1943) ; Florsieizn
Shoe Store Co. et aci v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union et al., 269 App. Div. 757, 55
N.Y. S. 2d 450 (2d Dep't 1945); Sachs Quality Furniture, Inc. v. Hensley, 269 App. Div.
264, 55 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1st Dep't 1945); La Manna v. O'Grady, 278 App. Div. 77, 103
N.Y.S.2d 476 (1st Dep't 1951); Siegel, Inc. v. Rosenzweig, 85 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. CL
1948) ; Theatre Co. v. Lederfine, 24 L. R. R. M. 2273 (Sup. CL June 30, 1949) ; Euclid Candy
Co. v. Scida et al, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1950); National Foundry Co. v. Quinnoner,
101 N.Y. S. 2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1950). In Haber & Fink, Inc. v. "John Jones," 277 App. Div.
176, 98 N.Y. S.2d 393 (1st Dep't 1950), the extreme violence and mass picketing consti-
tuted grounds for enjoining all picketing-Busch Jewelry Co. et al. v. United Retail
Employees' Union et al., 281 N.Y. 150, 22 N.E. 2d 320 (1939) ; Milk Wagon Drivers et al.
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941)-though not without compliance with
the requirements of C. P. A. § 876-a. May's Furs and Ready-to-Wear, Inc. et al. v. Bauer
et al., 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E. 2d 279 (1940).
149. Subdiv. 1 (f) (5).
150. United Auto Workers et al. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board et al., 336
U.S. 245 (1949).
151. Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1940), involving an
attempt to compel violation of the state anti-trust law.
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